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Abstract
There has been substantial recent interest in the decline of labour shares across
countries. For the most part, attention has been focused on developed countries. We
examine the evolution of India’s labour share in its formal industrial sector from 1983-
2014. Using two datasets corresponding to sectoral aggregate data and plant-level data
respectively, we document a secular decline in the labour share across all sectors from
1983, with a stabilisation at very low levels (around 8 to 10 percent) starting around
2005. We then use the plant-level data to identify the reasons for the overall decline in
the labour share. We find strong evidence to support multiple causes: increased capital
intensity, greater informalisation, greater privatisation, and productivity increases in
larger firms. As such, we suggest that the declines in labour share experienced are due
to a composite set of factors. Conversely, other potential explanations (for example,
regional variation in the labour share) have less explanatory power.
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Introduction and Motivation
The labour income share reflects how much of national value added accrues to labour as
opposed to capital. In recent times, there has been a revival of interest in the evolution of
the labour share across countries. Much of this has been inspired by the prolonged decline in
the fraction of income going to labour in the OECD countries beginning around 1980 after a
long period of relative stability. While there has been concern about growing interpersonal
inequality for a substantial period of time, the return to analyzing the share of an economy’s
national income which accrues to labour reflects the revival of a classical concern: whether
the return to owning capital exceeds the returns to labour. If productivity gains do not
translate into higher wages, this provides insight into the ways in which power dynamics
or the nature of technology in the economy translate into differing outcomes for different
classes of people. Indeed a common narrative suggests that political and economic changes
beginning in the last great crisis of capitalism in the 1970s led to a regime of accumulation
that has worked to the detriment of labour as a class. It has involved a transfer of power,
influence and economic advantage to capital across a range of policies (for example in terms
of allowing capital mobility, lowering taxes on capital and so on).
Many emprirical exercises have been undertaken to unpack the decline in labour shares in
developed countries, including technology (see among others[Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003;
Poterba, 1997] and global integration [Jayadev, 2007; Guscina, 2006] ). Other, more recent
efforts have focused on the role of privatisation [Azmat et al., 2012] or the role of imperfect
competition and the rise of ‘superstar’ firms which have lower than average labour shares
and which also account for a larger share of output than in the past. [Autor et al., 2017]1.
One might have expected that these declines in labour shares are concentrated in the indus-
trialised world and that the story in developing countries may be different since there has
been both rapid growth and attendant structural change in the developing world aduring
this period . More recent research suggests however that on average labour shares have
declined in developing economies as well (see [Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2013; Karabarbounis
and Neiman, 2013; Dao et al., 2017], among others). This in turn points to the possibility
of common features and drivers across the world.
Measuring the national labour share of income in developing countries has been hampered
because of the fact of both poor quality data and inherent ambiguity in the definition of the
labour share in a context of large scale self-employment (the output of which could equally
be attributed to labour or income). While some have tried to undertake adjustments using
UN SNA accounts (for an example, see [Van Treeck, 2017])
1There is, additionally some controversy as to whether the decline in labour share of GDP could be due
to measurement issues such as the treatment of depreciation, housing or self employment [Elsby et al., 2013;
Gollin, 2002]
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In this paper we adopt a different tack and instead look at labour share in a develop-
ing economy, India, in the sector that constitutes unambiguously wage employment: the
formal industrial sector. In doing so, we avoid the thorny questions of accounting for self-
employment and other related concerns. We examine the evolution of the industrial labour
share in India using two distinct but related datasets, the Annual Survey of Industries 3-
digit level dataset (corresponding to sector-level data) and the Annual Survey of Industries
5-digit level dataset (corresponding to plant-level data) that constitute the formal sector.
While this refers to a small fraction of the overall labour force, our hope is that by focusing
on this area we can more carefully examine both the trends in the labour share and its
correlates in a context in which it has not been adequately studied before.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we confirm that the global decline in labour share is
also observed in India in this sector of the economy. Since 1980, the industrial labour share
has declined by over 20 percentage points. Most of this decline occurred by 2007 after which
the labour share has been very low but stable. We then establish that while the majority
of decline in the labour share was accounted by within industry declines, using the more
disaggregated data, we find that between-factory effects dominate after the mid 2000s. We
then turn to the 5-digit data to identify plausible correlates of the labour share and find
evidence for multiple channels that are common in the literature .
While our paper is, we believe, relatively novel in this focus, we are not the first to use this
data. The paper that is closest to ours in spirit is Kapoor [2016] who provides a similar
analysis using ASI 5 digit data We differ here by concentrating on the correlates of the
labour share as opposed to examining labour intensity, by substantially expanding the time
period under question, and by identifying a larger set of correlates than this previous work.
Other related work includes Goldar and Aggarwal [2012].
Data
Any empirical exercise that examines the labor share needs to obtain a measure of the overall
wage bill and the total value added in any period. In order to assess the trends in the labor
share of income here, we obtain data from two different sources that provide information
about the functional distribution of income at different levels of aggregation.
Our longer time series data (the ASI 3 digit data) was acquired from the Economic and
Political Weekly Research Foundation’s (EPWRF) India Time Series database. Aggregated
at the 3-digit industry level, this ‘concorded series’ from the EPWRF gives us a relatively
comprehensive view of trends in the industrial sector across the country. Conducted by
the Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) Industrial Wing, under the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation (MOSPI), the ASI covers the industrial sector across the entire
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country. The frame contains all factories classified as per the Factories Act, 1948. The
factory-level data is then aggregated at various levels. The first dataset is aggregated at the
3-digit industry level and consists of just under 3200 industry-year observations spanning 41
years and 65 industries. Industries are classified according to MOSPI’s National Industrial
Classification (NIC) codes. Our shorter, but more disaggregated, time series data is an
unbalanced panel of over 800,000 factory-year observations for over 1700 5-digit industrial
sectors. Unfortunately, the data is only available from 2000 to 2014. Data provided in
both datasets include balance sheet measures such as fixed and working capital, income
statement measures such as wages and salaries paid, and other statistics on employment
and production. For the most part, we work with the latter dataset since it provides more
variables to use and on which to test the various hypotheses.
Our key variable of interest, the labour share of income, is defined as the ratio of wages and
salaries to value added by the industry (in the case of the 3-digit data) or the factory (in the
case of the 5-digit data). Hence by definition, the labour share should always be between
0 and 1. However, since gross value added is not reported directly by firms or factories,
we constructed this measure by subtracting the value of total inputs from the ex-factory
value of output. We ensured that we used theoreticaly consistent measures of the labour
share by excluding observations that had wage shares greater than 1. Any negative values
for value added were replaced by the ex-factory value of output. We also top-coded and
bottom-coded our capital intensity measure, by dropping outliers below the 1st percentile
and above the 99th percentile. Any anomalous, negative values for capital intensity were
dropped beforehand.
Figures 1a and 1b provides evidence of the long term decline in the labour share in both
datasets.
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Figure 1a: Aggregare Wage Share 1983-2014 (3-digit Level)
Figure 1b: Aggregare Wage Share 2000-2014 (5-digit Level)
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Between vs. Within Firm Declines
An important consideration in assessing the reasons for the decline in the labour share is
the extent to which the declines are driven by between-firm reallocation rather than a fall
in the labour share within firms. For example, if the main reason for the fall in labour share
is the decline in the bargaining power of labour across the economy, one should expect to
see within-firm effects dominate. If on the other hand, the main reason has to do with some
firms or sectors growing in size and also having below average labour shares, one should
expect between-firm effects to dominate.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c provide some indication of the dominant effects for both of the datasets.
With the longer time frame provided by the ASI 3D data it is clear that at that level of
aggregation, there have been declines in virtually all industries, strongly suggesting some
economy-wide patterns at play. The shorter time span ASI 5D data suggests two distinct
periods: one between 2000 and 2007 in which most factories saw declines and a period after
2007 in which there is no such strong pattern.
Figure 2a: Industry-level Change in Wage Share 1983-2014 (3-digit Level)
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Figure 2b: Industry-level Change in Wage Share 2000-2007 (5-digit Level)
Figure 2c: Industry-level Change in Wage Share 2007-2014 (5-digit Level)
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There are two ways in which one can assess the relative contribution of a between or within
effect. A common approach is to carry out a shift-share decomposition [Syrquin, 1984;
Timmer and Szirmai, 2000]. However, given the fact that for the 5-digit data data are
uneven, as it is an unbalanced panel, interpreting a shift share decomposition is difficult.
Instead we adopt a much simpler, but indicative regression as a benchmark to compare the
contribution of labour share declines. This involves estimating two equations for the dataset
where the data is in a panel form of factory (i=1...n), sector (j=1...n), and year (T=1...t).
We keep only two years for comparison of the effect (T=0,1). We then run the two following
regressions weighting each sector j by the weight of its wage bill in the overall wage bill for
each sector-year.
LSij = β0ij + β1Tij + ϵij (Equation 1a)
LSij = β0ij + β1Tij + cj + ϵij (Equation 1b)
Equation 1a measures the overall average change in the labour share for industry i between
the first year and last year. β1 includes between-industry, within-industry, and interaction
effects, weighted by output.
Equation 1b undertakes the same regression but now controls for between-industry differ-
ences by introducing industry dummies cj . As a result, β1 now represents only average
within-industry changes in the labour share.
Table 1 provides the result of these regressions for the 5-digit data, divided into 2 periods,
from 2000 to 2007 and from 2007 to 2014.. As is evident, there is a strong negative trend
between 2000 and 2007, and over half the effect can be attributed to within industry declines.
By contrast, between 2007 and 2014, there is no trend in the labour share of income.
The results suggest that in the first time period, the within-industry effect was very negative,
and reinforced an already negative overall trend in the labour share. By contrast, in the
latter period, the within-industry trend was much more varied, resulting in a positive albeit
statistically insignificant coefficient. The coefficient for the overall change in this period is
also positive and statistically insignificant, although of smaller magnitude, suggesting that
the between-industry effect was not large enough to counteract the within-industry effect.
To summarise, the period from 2000-2007 witnessed widespread, systematic declines in the
industrial wage share caused by negative between- and within-industry effects. Between
2007 and 2014, however, the downward trend ended, with industries facing diverse changes
in the labour share, and the regression results pointing to a trend-less, if not slightly positive,
aggregate change. This is in line with the wage share pattern as seen in Figure 1b.
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(2000-2007) (2007-2014)
Overall Within Overall Within
Period 1 -0.821∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(-3.28) (-6.64)
Period 2 0.101 0.256
(0.41) (1.64)
Observations 134 134 166 166
t-statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1: ‘Between-Within’ Regression: Equation 1a and Equation 1b
Regression Model
In this section, we identify and test four different channels that are identified in the literature
as key to the evolution of the labour share of income.
Technology A key determinant of the labour share in the literature is the nature of the
technology in the economy.
If factors of production are compensated according to its marginal productivity, shifts in
labour share is explained as a result of changes in factor productivity or a consequence of
increasing capital-intensity of production . In any standard production function, the degree
of substitution between factors has an effect on factor shares. More specifically, the magni-
tude of the elasticity of substitution (σ) can have vastly different economic implications; σ
measures the change in factor proportions in the production process in response to a change
in relative prices of the factors i.e. it measures how easily one factor can be substituted for
the other.
If σ = 1, then relative prices and the K/L ratio have no impact on factor income shares.
If σ < 1, this implies that increasing the supply of say, capital, increases the income share
of the labour, suggesting that the factors are complements. However, when σ > 1, this
implies that the factors are highly substitutable. In this case, a fall in the relative price
of capital causing increased use of capital (higher K/L) in the production process would
lead to a falling labour share of income [Poterba, 1997]. A similar argument is favored
by Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013] who argue that improvements in Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) have resulted in lower relative capital prices. Again, if
the capital-labour elasticity of substitution is greater than one, this will lead to lower labour
shares2. In order to test for this we use the ratio of fixed capital to total mandays as the
2It should be noted that most of the literature suggests that the elasticity of susbtitition is less than one
[Chirinko et al., 2011; Lawrence, 2015; Oberfield and Raval, 2014; Antras, 2004; Hamermesh, 1996]. For a
9
explanatatory variable.
Privatisation Azmat et al. [2012] argue that privatisation reduces labour’s share since the
profit motive means that the incentives of managers move away from objectives such as job
protection or ‘creating an empire’ because it shifts the incentives of senior managers towards
shedding labour and increasing productivity. Specifically, private firms are expected to be
less interested or requiring to be responsive to pressures from labor. In particular, Azmat
et al. [2012] find that privatization leads to a sharp decline in the amount of employment
and that it is this channel, rather than the reduction of labor’s bargaining strength, that
leads to the declines in labor share. While we do find sizeable impacts of privatization, we
do not try and address why this change came about. In order to test this channel, we use
data on whether a firm is listed as private or public.. During the period under consideration,
there was some privatization but the vast majority of firms are private sector firms.
Employment Protection Another common determinant of declines in labour share is
the weakening of the organisational strength of unions and/or the adoption of employment
policies that reduce employment protection. Given the fact that India’s labour force is
not heavily unionised, the main way in which employment protection can be reduced is a
widespread informalisation of labour. Production workers in India’s manufacturing sector
aare of two kinds: those having employment protection and benefits who are termed ‘per-
manent’ and those hired from outside contractors who are not eligible for such protections
(called ‘contract’ workers). There is evidence that informalisation of the formal labour force
is increasingly a concern in India [Sengupta et al., 2009].As Das et al. [2015] note,
“it is important to point out that there is emerging evidence that employers in formal
manufacturing in India circumvent the problems posed by the restrictive institutions .. by
employing contract workers who are outside the purview of the major labour laws (Kapoor
[2014]; Chaurey [2015]). Instead, contract workers and their employment are regulated by the
provisions of the Contract Labour Act (CLA) 1970. The Act, which was originally intended to
protect the interests and welfare of contract workers, is now used by employers to circumvent
other restrictive labour laws. The CLA and particularly recent judicial interpretations of
the Act in the 2000s in favour of principal employers has actually led to de facto reforms
making the labour market more flexible contrary to popular perception.”
Several reasons have been provided for this increase in informalisation, Goldar and Aggarwal
[2012] argue for example that import competition forces movement towards a low labour
protections regime in order for firms to remain competitive. A more prominent and often
comprehensive note on the relationship between the elasticity of substiution and factor shares, see Chirinko
and Mallick [2014]
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cited argument is that labour laws, and in particular the Industrial Disputes Act have worked
as a deterrent on formalisation since onerous labour regulations work as a disincentive to
formal labour hiring (For a contrary view see ?). The ASI 5-digit level data allows us to
directly test for the effect of informalisation on the labour share since it includes data on
contract workers3.
Concentration Finally, a newer, but important explanation provided by Autor et al.
[2017] is that much of the decrease in the labour share in the US and other developed
countries can be explained by the rise of ‘superstar’ firms with high profits and a low share
of labour in firm value-added and sales. These firms are able to reduce costs and produce
a larger part of the overall value simultaneously, implying that as an industry comes to be
dominated by such firms, this could come with lower labour costs. Autor et al. [2017] suggest
that industries are increasingly characterized by a “winner take most” feature where a small
number of firms obtain a very large share of the market. If production requires a fixed
amount of overhead labor, then larger firms and greater concentration could lead to lower
labor shares. Similarly if markups in the product market correlate positively with firm size
then one might expect that there is a decrease in the overall labor share. If a ‘superstar’
firm’s share of output in the industry increases, one might expect that the labour share
within the industry would fall. We proxy for this by using the share of a firm’s value added
in the industry’s value added as indicative of a ‘superstar’ firm effect.
Other variables One explanation that is conspicuous by its absence is any variable to
control for global integration. We had wished to try and use the degree of de facto trade
integration or measures of protection for various industries. Unfortunately however, the
ASI data is classified according to the National Industry Classification while trade data is
classified using the HS6 system. While there are bridges available, the NIC code used in the
dataset change over time, and therefore the existing bridges which might be used are prone
to be full of errors. This is a task for further research. In future work, we hope to also limit
the sample to include firms that are primarily producing for the domestic market and which
has primarily domestic competition vs. those that are more internationally exposed.
Table 2 provides unweighted summary statistics for the variables of concern, while Table 3
provides the same statistics except now the data is weighted by gross value added. Both
tables provide the summary statistics over the entire time period, as well as for two sub-
periods (2000-2007 and 2008-2014). An interesting point to note is that in the unweighted
data, the mean wage share is over 30%, which would at first glance seem at odds with the
3[Kapoor, 2016] explores this relationship centrally as well. As she notes, ’[T]he increase in contract
workers accounted for about 47% of the total increase in employment in the organised manufacturing’ from
2001-2011’
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aggregate trend observed in Figure 1b. This is a compositional effect due to the existence of
a large number of very low-output factories with high wage shares. As soon as we account
for this by weighting the data, as in Table 3, the mean wage share is below 8%.
Figure 3 provides the trend in the total number of factory employees over time. Figures
4a, 4b and 4c provide some visual evidence of the relationship between these explanatory
variables and the wage share. In each case, the variable is the residual of the variable after
controlling for industry fixed effects. This is done since the initial level of capital intensity,
contract share and size differ widely by industry type. The figures provide some prima facie
evidence that of some co-evolution between the variables.
Period Wage Share Capital Intensity Relative Size Contract Workers
2000-2014
Mean 30.3% 425311 0.25% 50.8%
Median 25.8% 200325 0.02% 50.4%
SD 21.5% 699129 2.22% 27.9%
N 464370 291760 508424 185275
2000-2007
Mean 30.3% 310910 0.23% 49.5%
Median 25.5% 146629 0.01% 48.5%
SD 21.7% 552825 1.89% 28.4%
N 227058 137394 250924 81086
2008-2014
Mean 30.3% 527119 0.26% 51.9%
Median 26.0% 265698 0.01% 51.8%
SD 21.3% 793557 2.50% 27.5%
N 237313 154366 257500 104189
Table 2: Summary Statistics (5-Digit): Unweighted
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Period Wage Share Capital Intensity Relative Size Contract Workers
2000-2014
Mean 7.6% 1706321 8.3% 46.8%
Median 2.6% 852333 3.4% 48.8%
SD 11.5% 1866948 13.0% 24.6%
N 464371 259000 504959 164808
2000-2007
Mean 8.9% 1185386 7.2% 40.0%
Median 4.3% 507215 3.0% 35.9%
SD 12.3% 1486183 12.4% 26.4%
N 227058 122434 248880 71786
2008-2014
Mean 7.2% 1905213 8.7% 48.5%
Median 2.1% 1026174 3.5% 51.6%
SD 11.3% 1956988 13.2% 23.8%
N 237313 136566 256079 93022
Table 3: Summary Statistics (5-Digit): Weighted
Figure 3: Total Number of Employees in Sample
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Figure 4a: Mean Wage Share vs Mean Capital Intensity
Figure 4b: Mean Wage Share vs Mean Contract Worker Share
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Figure 4c: Mean Wage Share vs Mean Factory Output Share
In order to formally test for these effects we estimate the following regression using the
5-digit data:
LSit = β0i + β1KLit + β2PV Tit + β3SIZEit + β4INFOit + cit + ϵit (Equation 2)
where
LSit = Logged wage share of factory i at time t.
PV Tit = Dummy variable signifying if a factory is publicly or privately owned.
SIZEit = Logged share of the factory’s output vis-á-vis its industry’s output.
INFOit = Logged share of contract worker days in the factory’s total mandays.
We consider additional controls to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, we
include a full set of industry and year fixed effects (cit) intended to capture a variety of
factors such as the quality of workers and any time specific impacts that may arise (for
example due to the business cycle), and an error term (ϵit). Data is weighted using the
weights provided within the ASI.
Table 4 provides the result of the regression. We utiilize a log-log framework for ease of in-
terpretation. In accordance with the theory and extended literature mentioned here, we find
sizeable and statistically significant relationships between the explanatory variables and the
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labour share. Increases in capital intensity, privatisation, relative size, and informalisation
at the factory level are all associated with declines in the wage share. Our log-log regression
model allows for fairly straightforward interpretation of the coefficients; a 1% increase in
capital intensity is associated with a fall in the wage share of approximately a fourth of a
percentage point. A 1% increase in the relative size of a factory unit’s output within its
industry is associated with a fall in the wage share of ∼0.12%, and the corresponding figure
for an increase in the fraction of contract workers in the factory’s workforce is also ∼0.12%.
The change in the wage share associated with the privatisation indicator shifting from 0 to
1 is 100 · (eβ2 − 1), which translates to -10.06%.
Wage Share
Log(K/L) -0.245∗∗∗
(-97.36)
Private Indicator -0.106∗∗∗
(-8.44)
Log(Size) -0.120∗∗∗
(-79.65)
Log(Informalisation) -0.119∗∗∗
(-32.97)
Observations 95345
t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Regression results from estimating Equation 2
Regional Variation
Economic activity across India is not uniformly distributed, and tends to be concentrated
within certain states and cities. A potential alternative explanation for the decline in the
labour share is geographical disparities. If, for instance, production and value added was
shifting increasingly to low wage share states, the aggregate wage share would decline.
Similarly, since industries of particular types may be concentrated in paticular areas and
if these industries experience sharper declines in the labor share, one might expect to see
prononouced regional variation
Figure 6 on page 18 shows that in fact, there is very little variation in trends and levels of
the state-level wage share. While there exist a few states which experienced more dramatic
changes in the wage share (e.g. Manipur, Nagaland), these are usually smaller states with
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very little share in the overall value added in the country. We have tried a regression on wage
share trends interacted with state dummies, but apart from these three of four anomalies,
there is little evidence of any state seeing particularly different trends on average. As such,
regional redistribution of production does not seem prima facie to be another plausible
explanation for the decline in the aggregate wage share.
A common perception is that industrial performance in India is heavily linked with labour
market regulations. It is important to note, however, that there have been several challenges
to this narrative (See Nagaraj [2002], for instance). Dutta [2003] and Ramaswamy [2003]
argue that the increasingly common practice of employing contract labour has limited the
effectiveness of labour market regulations in general. Nonetheless, we test for the impact
of labour market rigidities by using a ‘labour market rigidity index’ created by Gupta
et al. [2009]4. They construct this composite measure of labour regulations across states
by examining studies and common patterns in state-level labour regulations. States are
then classified into ‘flexible’, ‘neutral’ or ‘inflexible’ labour market regimes. Figure 5 plots
the wage share by these two categories. While states with inflexible labour market regimes
initially did have a higher wage share compared to states with flexible labour market regimes,
there is a clear convergence and the difference has all but vanished by 2005. Once again,
this suggests that the phenomena of declining labour shares is a pan-India phenomenon.
Figure 5: Change in Wage Share by States (Flexible vs Inflexible LMR
4For a detailed discussion on labour market regulations, see Anant et al. [2006].
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Discussion and Conclusion
We have here provided some description of the evolution of and determinants of the industrial
labour share in India. The most striking feature has been the long term decline from around
30% in the 1980s to below 10% now. Like in other economies, capital intensive technology,
industrial organization towards more output being produced by low labour cost firms and
the reduction in bargaining strength of labour are all robust correlates of this decline. We
have made here no attempts at attempting to establish causality, and suggest here broad
correlations that have plausible theoretical bases.
It should be remembered that here we are talking about a small part of India’s labour force,
and indeed a small part of India’s industrial labour force. The vast majority of workers, even
in industry are not captured by these surveys. That noted, we believe that our exercise still
provides some illumination and some sobering considerations for policy makers. First, given
that these data are from the formal sector, they are likely to reflect that part of the industry
where the conditions of work and the labour-capital bargain are most favourable for workers.
Moreover, it represents the majority of the value added in the Industrial sector. In the larger
informal sector, while the labour share might be higher (given that capital intensity is likely
to be lower), the quality of jobs is likely to be much worse. The firms represented in the
ASI are therefore a benchmark for desirable jobs available (in the industrial sector at least)
for the large and growing Indian labour force.
Moreover, the decline in India’s labour share runs counter to the typical trajectory with
development first noted by Kravis [1962] and Kuznets and Murphy [1966] who suggested
that the process of development and the attendant structural change, as labour moved out
of agriculture into organised wage labour, urbanization and demographic changes, would
serve to increase the labour share. Indeed, Ortega and Rodriguez [2001] find that in general
manufacturing labour shares increase with the level of income of a country, while Jayadev
[2007] finds that labour shares economy-wide do so as well. India’s decreasing labour share
during a period of very rapid growth is then at least a little puzzling.
In the last decade or so, various governments have rightly identified weak labour markets
and lack of employment opportunities as a key concern for the Indian economy. Our analysis
provides additional reason for concern. We show that, at least in the formal sector, workers
have seen wages going substantially slower than productivity (hence the fall in wage share) -
a process that will also serve to increase inequality. At the current juncture, workers obtain
less than a tenth of the gross value added as compensation.
While we have provided some indication of some proximate correlates, we do not by any
means suggest that these are exhaustive (indeed, we have reason to believe that at least
one key channel - internationalization, is missing in our explanation). Although we have
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emphasized the importance of privatization, technology, concentration and informalization
we cannot explain all of the fall in the labour shares even in an accounting sense. Other
variables such as government industrial policies or globalization write large may be possi-
bilities but are vedy difficult to tackle with micro-economic data and with the limitations
of the particular datasets we use. Future work might incorporate this and other concerns
in designing interventions and policies.
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